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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * * *
KAMAS STATE BANK,
A Utah Corporation,

)
)
)

Respondent and Plaintiff,

-vsJ. BUYS CUMMINGS and
MARY CUMMINGS, et. al.,
Appellants and

Case No.·

)
)
)
)
)

9798

)
)

Defendant~.

)

* * * * * * * *
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF. FACTS
For purpose of appeal we

~ccept

the

Statement of Facts set forth in Appellants•
brief.
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GENERAL RESPONSE TO
APPELLANTS' BRIEF
At the outset Respondent would like to
make the following observation about
Appellants• Brief:
Th~re

appears to be a general 'effort on

the part of the Appellants in writing their
brief to cloud the issues by making continued
reference to matters that are wholly
irrelevant and immaterial.
First, Appellants refer, both directly
and indirectly, to an insurance company.
There is no insurance company, as a party,
plaintiff or defendant, before the court
and such references are wholly out of order
and improper.
Second, Appellants take the position
that in the -commercial world third parties
must look for and seek out the feelings of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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all parties who are or might be affected by
their acts.

That is, third parties are

bound to determine not only if parties are
legally bound but must also see if they
feel morally bound·.

For example:

"Respondent •••• ma'de no effort .••• to determine
whether or not the Appellants felt they
had a binding option ...

In other words they

are saying that Respondent is not to look
to the law or precedent but to what each
individual feels before_it can act and have
the protection of the law.

This in essence

destroys the long es.tablished principal of
Stare Decisis •.
ARGUMENT
I

THE AGREEMENT IS NOT A TRUE OPTION BUT
IN REALITY ONLY A RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION OR
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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OF FIRST REFUSAL.
It is a well settled rule in this State
as well as other jurisdictions that· the
agreement on which the Defendants claim
their priority of interest is not a true
option but only the right of "pre-emption"
or of "first refusal" and that until the
Bourgeois decide to sell, no option springs
into being.

In Chournos vs.

Ev~na

I~vestme~t

Company, 93 Pacific 2nd 450, 97 Utah 335,
the Court states "An option to purchase may
be defined as a contract by which an owner
agrees with another person that he shall
have the privilege of buying his property
at a fixed price within a specified time.
The land owner does not sell his land; he
does not then agree to sell it; but he does
then sell something,---viz., the right or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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privilege to buy at the election, or option
of the other party.

The second party gets

in praesenti, not lands, nor an agreement
that he shall have lands, but he does get
something of value; that is the r_ight ·to
call for and receive lands if he elects ...
In this case the Court held that the provision
giving a person the first opportunity

t~

purchase the land did not constitute an
option.

For the individual did not have

the "right to call for and receive lands if he elected.

11

He only had this right after

the owner decided to sell.

Ip the case at

hand until Bourgeois decided to sell, Mr.
Cummings had no power to require him to do
so.

In Re Rigby's Estate, 167 Pacific 2nd

964, Wyoming Case, 1946; J~mes On Option
Contracts, Sections 101, 211, 212; Williston
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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On Contracts, Section 43, page 71, First
Edition,

Sectio~

44, page 129 of Revised

Edition; Restatement of Property, Section
393, comment f, and Section 413, comment b.
Until Mr. Bourgeois decided to sell,
Mr. Cummings had no right or interest in
the property and thus, when it became
necessary for Mr. Bourgeois to borrow money
on his property, the mortgagor, Kamas.State
Bank, had a right to take a first lien upon
the property which would be good against all
other parties who might claim an interest in
the future.

This includes the interest of

J. Buys Cummings which at most could spring
into being only after Bourgeois decided to
sell.

After Mr. Bourgeois had found it

necessary to mortgage his property, possibly
he was estopped to offer it for sale 'until
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the mortgage had been cleared.

In the event

it became necessary for Mr. Bourgeois to
sell in order to avoid the foreclosure
action, then it would be impossible to
perform, and it would seem that the
individual who held the first right of
refusal could at most have an action against
Mr. Bourgeois for damages.

In James On

Option Contracts, 504, Section 1104, we read
"If d-uring the time he breaches

as follows:
~he

option agreemeri_t by repudiating the

option, or by placing himself in a position
where it is impossible for him to perform,
it would seem the optionee has an action to
recover damages arising from· the breach of
the option.

11

In as much as J. Buys Cummings had only
a "pre-emptive right" or "right of first
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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refusal" he had no immediate interest in
the land and thus, the mortgage created a
first lien on the property.
had no true option until

In fact, he

~ourgeois

decided

to sell •.
II
A RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION THAT ESTABLISHES
A FIXED PRICE IS VOID.
In Simes On Future Interests, pa·ge 347 ,·
Section 102, we find the following under
Pre-emption Conditions:
"Suppose A conveys land to B in
fee on the· express condition that B
desires to sell he must first offer
the land to A at the lowest price he
is willing to accept from any other
vendee. Or suppose the condition is
that, if B desires to sell he must
first offer the property to A at a
fixed price, or at a price which is a
percentage of, or lower than, he is
willing to accept_ from anyone else •.
In the second case, it may be said
that this is merely a qualified
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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forfeiture restraint on a fee simple and
should be held void. There is
authority to that effect. On the other
hand, in the first case, where the
restraint is to the effect that the
grantee will first offer the property
to the grantor at the lowest price
which he will accept from anyone else,
it would seem that marketability is
not, in fact, restrained at all. The
owner can sell to his grantor or to
anyone else in the world at any price
which he desires. The only restriction
is that he cannot prefer any other
vendee over his grantor."
Mr. Cummings' position clearly_ falls
within the second dase which should be
held void.

It is clearly distinguishable

from the case of Cummings et. ux. vs.
Nielson et. al., 42 Utah 157, which is
quoted by Appellants in their brief, the
case of Cummings et. ux. vs. Nielson et. al.
falling within first case which is valid as
contrasted with the second which is void.
In Brace vs. Black, 144 A 2nd 385, 51
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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.

New Jersey Super. 572, we have a case
wherein the facts are basically that there
was a pre-emption agreement, whereby the
land owner, should he decide to sell land,
would give to the other party the right and
option to purchase for a stated sum, such
right to expire with death of the party.
The Supreme Court in holding the right of
option invalid reasoned as follows:.

"The .

first matter to be considered is the validity
of the so called option, which is really a
mere right .of refusal or right of pre-emption.
The Court below held that the agreement was
too vague and indefinite-to be inforcible ·
and that it was an unreasonable limitation
on alienability.
·"Restatement, Property I Section 413

(2)

1

states:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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'A promissory restraint or
forfeiture restraint on the alienation
of a legal estate in land which is in
the form of a provision (a) that the
owner of the estate shall not sell the
same without first offering to sell to
some designated person, •••• at a fixed
price .••• is valid if, and only if, the
restraint is valid under rules stated
in Section 406-411.'
"Section 404 thereof defines a promisso·ry
restraint on alienation as an attempt by an
otherwise effective conveyance or contract
to cause a later conveyance to impose
contractual liability on the one who makes
the later Gonveyance when

sue~

results from a breach of an

liability

a~reement

not to

convey.
-"There is in the law a well-recognized
policy of freedom of alienation of property.
This is so embedded that restraints on
alienation must be in some way justified in
order to be upheld.

In the Restatement under

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Section 413, at page 2442, we find this
illustration:
'A owning Blackacre in fee simple
absolute makes an otherwise effective
conveyance there "to B and his heirs,
and B covenants for himseif, his heirs,
executors and assigns, that if C is
still ~live, he will not sell -Blackacre
without first offering Blackacre to C
for $5000.00." Cis in being at the
time of the conveyance. The promissory
restraint is invalid.'
In the comment under Section 413, _2 (a) , we
find the following at page 2444:
'When, by the terms Of the
restraint, the price at which the
estate must be offered to the designated
person is fixed or is to be a certain
percentage of a third party's offer,
there is substantial _curtailment of
the alienability of the land. A fixed
price is usually set sufficiently low,
in the light of possible developernenfs,
to enable the designated person to
reap the benefits of any increase in
value .•.. the owner of the estate will
--be deterred from attempting to sell his
property because of the improbability
that he will realize the full market
value. This hindrance to alienation
brings these provisions within the rules.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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previously stated in Section 406-411.'
.. Restatement, Property, Section 406,
declares that a restraint on the alienation
of a legal possessory estate in fee simple
which is, or but fortherestraint would be,
indefeasible is valid if, and only if, among
other things the restraint is reasonable
under the circumstances.
II

.

In a comment upon reasonableness

under the foregoing section, at page 2407,
mig~t

various factors are set forth which
tend to support the reasonableness
unreasonableness of a restraint.

o~

It is

pointed out that these factors are not
exhaustive and that •each case must be
thoroughly examined in the light of all
circumstances to determine whether the
.objective sought to be

accomplishe~

by the

restraint is worth attaining at the cost of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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interfering with the freedom of alienation
or to determine whether the particular
interference with alienability is so slight
as not to be material.'
... Restraints against alienation are.not
favored by law, but on the contrary there is
a strong public policy in favor of the free
tra~sferability

of property; and restraints

thereon have been characterized as.obnoxious
to public policy and void. •

73 C.J.S.

Property, Section 13, page 195.
11

•

All re-straints on alienation run

counter to the policy of freedom of alienation so that to be upheld they must in
some way be justified.'

Restatement,

Property, Section 405, Comment.
11

In the situation presented in this

case there has been no adequate showing of
purpose that the restra.l.nt on alienation

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Was to Serve. "

Brace vs . Bla c k , Supra.

A more complete reading of the
Restatement of Property reveals the following:
Section 406, Indefeasible Possessory Estates
in Fee Simple.
f. Application---Restraints
qualified only as to manner of
alienation. If the full benefits
which flow from the freedom to alienate
what is or otherwise would be an
indefeasible legal possessory estate
in fee simple are to be obtained, the
owner of such an estate must be able to
take advantage of any of the existing
methods of transferring property • . Any
restraint which interferes with the
power to alienat.e in some manner,
though it leaves the owner of the
estate free to alienate in other ways,
places a substantial hindrance in the
way of the disposition of the property
and the-rule stated in this. section
prevents ~uch interference.
Illustrations:
7. A owning Blackacre in fee
simple absolute, makes an otherwise
effective conveyance thereof "to B
and his heirs, but if Blackacre is
ever mortgaged, A or his heirs shall
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

have a right to re-enter and terminate
the estate conveyed... The forfeiture .
restraint on Blackacre which prohibits
only mortgage is invalid. B has an
undefeasible estate in fee simple.
In essence the.restraint in the case at
hand prohibited for all practical purposes
the mortgaging of 'Mr. Bourgeois' property.
And in Section 406, in n, pages 2412,
2413 we read as follows:
n. Application---Change in
Circumstances. A restraint ~n the
alienation of that which is or otherwise would be an indefeasible legal
possessory estate in fee simple which
fails to satisfy the requirements of
Clauses (a), (b). and (c) at the time
of its creation is~invalid and is not
made valid by a change in circumstances
at any later date. If, however, the
restraint at the time of its creation
in the light of the circumstances
which then exist, a change in circumstance which makes the enforcement of
the restatement unreasonable renders
it invalid. The restraint must not
only be valid at its inception, but
must pass the test for validity at the
date when the enforcement of it is
sought.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It is certainly evident that at the time
Mr. Cummings attempted to take advantage of
his right of first refusal, that the circumstances rendered the inforcement of the
restraint unreasonable, and, thus, invalid.
See also Maynard v~. Polhemus, 15 P 451;
Falkenstein et. al. vs.

Pipper~

California

case, 183 P 2nd 707; Crecents vs. Vernier,
204 P 2nd 785, 53 N.M. 185: in Hardy vs.
Galloway, 15 Southeastern, 890, 111 N.c.
519, wherein the grantor of land retained
for himself and his heirs the.right to
repurchase the larid when sold, and stipulated
that, if the the grantee should sell or
mortgage the land without giving grantor
and his heirs the right to repurchase, the
deed should be void.
bad as repugnant.

The condition was held

See In.Re Roscher, 26

Ch. D. 801; Tiffany, Volume 5 on Real Property,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Section 1345, page 166; Gray, Restraints of
Alienation, Section 26, page 18.
I

The case in controversy is but a
futile-effort of Mr. Cummings to control
alienation,_which if recognized would result
in unjust
an

enrichm~nt

injustic~

to J. Buys Cummings and

to the Plaintiff, Kamas State

Bank, and Mr. Joe Bourgeois and his wife.
III
EVEN IF THE RESTRAINT HAD BEEN VALID,
MR. J. BUYS CUMMINGS' REMEDY WOULD HAVE BEEN
AGAINST JOE BOURGEOIS FOR INCUMBERING HIS
LAND AND HE WOULD HAVE HAD TO RELY ON THE
COVENANTS IN HIS WARRANTY DEED.
In Knight vs. Southern Pacific Company,
172 P - - 689, 693, •52 Utah 42 the Supreme
Court of Utah states:

"In view that it was

shown that the option agreement was subsequently merged into a·deed in which the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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right of way was conveyed by plaintiff •..•
held that plaintiff could rely upon the
option agreement only for the purpose of
showing consideration for putting in of the
new crossing and the wire-wing fence •••• the
Court's ruling, however, conforms to the
doctrine that, where a written antecedent
contract to convey real property is merged
into a deed, the grantor ordinarily must
rely on the covenants contained in the deed
and cannot predicate a right of action upon
an .antecedent contract ...

And in Utah Savings

and Trust Company vs. Stoutt, 102 P 865,
867, 36 Utah 206, we read:
be conceded

th~t

11

Although it

Adeline Stoutt agreed to

convey a marketable title in the contract of
sale, yet, when the warranty deed was
executed and delivered under which possession
was given and taken, the contract of sale was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fully executed and its provisions were
merged in the deed, and Fleishman thereafter
was bound to rely upon the covenants in the
deed, and if any breach occurred in any one
of them he was required to sue and recover
in a proper action for breach of such
covenants.

We think no case can be found,

and counsel have cited none, where an action
was based upon an executed contract of sale
after such contract had been fully performed
by the execution and delivery_of a deed and
the vendee was given possession under i.t.
The deed conveying the property sold by the
contract is ordinarily-a complete execution
of the contract of sale, and the covenants
in the deed must thereafter be looked to
for redress in case of defects in the title."
And~in

Reese Howell Company vs. Brown, 158

p 684,

689, 48 Utah 142. our Court states,
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"No rule of law is better settled than that,
where a deed has been executed and accepted
as performance of an executory contract to
convey real estate, the contract is functus
officio, and the rights of the parties rest
thereafter solely on the deed.

This is so

although the deed thus accepted varies from
that stipulated for in the contract, as where
the vendee accepts the deed of a third party
in lieu of the deed of his vendor; and as,
in the sale$ of land, the law remits the
party to his covenants in his deed, if there.
be no ingredient of fraud or mistake in the
case, and the party has not taken the precaution to secure himself by covenants, he
has no remedy for his money, even on failure
of title."
Mr. Cununings has no standing in a quiet
title action against the Plaintiff, Kamas
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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State Bank, except to establish the amount
of the lien.

And if his title has failed,

his recourse is on the covenants in his
deed and not upon a pre-emptive right or
right of first refusal which had not even
bloomed into an_ option at the time Joe
Bourgeois. encumbered his property with the
lien created by the mortgage of Kamas State
Bank.
Other materials which may be. helpful
are:

55 Am Jur 493, Section 27; 5 Am Jur 113j

Section 8, 63; 55 Am Jur 506, Section 37;
C.JoS., Vendor and Purchaser, Section 13,
36 ALR, 1438 n., 162 ALR, 590 n., 596 n.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing Respondent respectful:
submits that the lower court properly held
as a matter of law that Respondent's
mortgage was superior to any claim of J. Buys:
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Cummings and Mary J. Cummings, his wife, for
the following reasons:
1.

At the time the land was mortgaged,

Mr. Cummings and his wife had no present
interest in the land.
2.

Mr. Cummings' restraint on

alienation was invalid as against public
policy.
3.

Any possible claim that he might

have on his pre-emption agreement would at
most be confined to the covenants in his
warranty deed.
4.

To make Mr. Cummings' claim superior

to that of the Kamas State Bank would result
in unjust enrichment to Mr. Cummings and
wife and an injustice to Mr. Bourgeois and
the Plaintiff, Kamas State Bank.

n:;
~&
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